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INTRODUCTION
On his seventieth birthday, Judge Nugent swam 1,000 yards-the
4,000th yard he swam that week.I However, Judge Nugent did not
go to work on his birthday, nor any subsequent day. If he did, he
would relinquish all his annual compensation, salary, or retirement
compensation. 2 Judge Nugent and three colleagues, believing the
assumption of disability and incompetence triggered by the celebra-
tion of a seventieth birthday to be unfair and arbitrary, challenged
the Missouri constitutional provision that mandated their retirement
at age seventy in Gregory v. Ashcroft.3
Unlike United States Supreme Court justices and other article III
judges who are appointed for life,4 many state court judges are re-
1. Minneapolis Star Tribune, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1OKe, col. 1.
2. "[A]ny judge who becomes eligible after August 13, 1988 for annual com-
pensation, salary or retirement compensation ... but fails to retire on or before his
seventieth birthday shall automatically waive all such annual compensation, salary
and retirement compensation." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 476.683 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (en-
acted 1988). See also Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26(1) (1976).
3. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
4. Lifetime tenure for "good behavior" is guaranteed by article III of the
United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Critics of lifetime tenure
have identified past instances of advanced "senility, broken health and physical disa-
bility" on the federal bench. See, e.g., Atkinson, Retirement and Death on the United States
Supreme Court: From Van Devanter to Douglas, 45 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1976). Justice
William 0. Douglas' tenacity in holding his seat is often identified as an egregious
example of the problems that can result from lifetime appointment. "A toughened
survivor of polio and a near drowning in childhood, plus an almost fatal riding acci-
dent and a weakened heart while on the court, he had been partly paralyzed by a
1
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quired to retire at a specified age. Twenty-nine states have enacted
statutory or constitutional provisions forcing their trial and appellate
judges to retire, usually at age seventy.5 Repeated challenges to the
legality of these mandatory retirement provisions have focused on
the application of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)6 and on the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion. Almost uniformly, these challenges have failed, primarily be-
cause the retirement plans were deemed to be a legitimate way to
accomplish the proper state goals of ensuring a qualified and effi-
cient judiciary and providing opportunities for younger lawyers to
attain judgeships.7
Proponents of mandatory retirement assert that it allows for the
impersonal removal of older judges and avoids the difficulty of deter-
mining which judges are senile and which are not. The existence of
these mandatory retirement provisions presumes that an individual's
physical and mental abilities progressively degenerate upon reaching
a certain age.8 Empirical evidence, however, does not establish that
advanced age and senility are synonymous.9 Chronological age
stroke [in 1974] and was confined to a wheelchair." Douglas Finally Leaves the Bench,
TIME, Nov. 24, 1975, at 69. Justice Douglas continued to participate in the Court's
business, although his appearances on the bench for oral argument were constantly
interrupted either by spasms of pain or by falling asleep. Finally, on November 12,
1975, Justice Douglas retired at the age of 77, concluding nearly 37 years of service
on the Court. Id.
5. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS & NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1987 (1988) (survey of state appellate
and trial court requirements and qualifications for justices and judges).
6. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988) (Massachusetts'
constitutional provision requiring mandatory retirement ofjudges at age 70 upheld.);
Gregory, 898 F.2d at 598 (Missouri constitutional provision requiring mandatory re-
tirement ofjudges at age 70 upheld.).
In contrast,Judge Clarence C. Newcomer of the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania ruled that Pennsylvania's constitutional requirement that
judges aged 70 or over must retire or accept reduced pay and benefits violates the
equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. Sabo v. Casey, 757 F.
Supp. 587 (E.D. Pa. 1991). The State of Pennsylvania claimed that this provision
increased available judicial manpower at a time of an escalating case load and re-
duced senility on the state bench. The Sabo court determined that Pennsylvania's
justification for the provision was a legitimate state goal. Id. at 603. The court found
that the means used to achieve the goal, however, were not rationally related to the
stated goal. Id. Rather, the Court decided that the "transparent objective of the
constitutional provision [was] to obtain judicial services without paying the full costs
of those services." Id. Thus, the Pennsylvania provision "constitutes purposeful and
invidious discrimination." Id.
8. Finkelstein, Minimum Physical Standards-Safeguarding the Rights of Protective
Workers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1053, 1074
(1989).
9. See Staudinger, Cornelius & Baltes, The Aging of Intelligence: Potential and Limits,
1991]
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alone does not determine a person's functional ability. These argu-
ments for mandatory retirement fail to consider the value of a
judge's accumulated wisdom and experience on the bench, and that
each person ages differently.1O
Federal circuit courts are currently in conflict on the issue of
whether a state can require mandatory retirement of its judges.II
The United States Supreme Court will have an opportunity to re-
solve this conflict when it reviews the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, which upheld a Missouri
constitutional provision requiring retirement of some of its judges at
age seventy.12
This Case Note focuses on the application of the ADEA to state
judiciary through an analysis of the circuit courts' interpretations of
the ADEA's exceptions for "policy-makers." Additionally, this Case
Note examines the constitutional arguments concerning forced re-
tirement of the judiciary. The Case Note then suggests that the
Court apply an intermediate level scrutiny in evaluating the equal
protection challenge to mandatory retirement provisions where, as
here, a state's objective is based on an outdated and erroneous stere-
otype that "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society."13 Age, like gender, is an "immutable
characteristic" that is determined solely by the accidental timing of
one's birth and bears little relationship to one's ability to perform.14
Therefore, any discriminatory state law provisions based on age
503 THE ANNALS 43, 45 (1989) [hereinafter Aging of Intelligence ] (providing empirical
evidence of effects of aging on intelligence and ability).
10. Finkelstein, supra note 8, at 1075; see also Aging of Intelligence, supra note 9, at
46.
11. See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
12. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990). Mandatory retirement is a sensitive subject for the Supreme Court. The fol-
lowing four justices are 70 or older: Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun,
Byron White, and John Paul Stevens.
13. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). In Frontiero, the Supreme
Court struck down gender classifications that allowed a married serviceman to re-
ceive increased allowances whether or not his wife was dependent on him, but al-
lowed a married servicewoman to receive additional allowances only if her husband
was dependent on her. The Court concluded that such discrimination had the effect
of putting women "not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Id. at 684. The Court ob-
served: "As a result [of reliance on outdated stereotypes], statutory distinctions ...
often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class . . . to inferior legal
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members." Id. at 686-
87. Although Frontiero included gender classifications among suspect classifications,
thus triggering strict scrutiny, later gender discrimination cases have relied on inter-
mediate scrutiny for this classification. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Bowen, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Intermediate
scrutiny seems equally applicable to age-based classification.
14. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
(Vol. 17
3
Severson: Age Discrimination Law—Mandatory Retirement of Judges: Law and Po
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
MANDATORY RETIREMENT
should be viewed with the same intermediate level of scrutiny as ap-
plied to those based on gender. This Case Note concludes with sug-
gestions of less restrictive alternatives to mandatory retirement that
will ensure preservation of a highly qualified and competent judici-
ary, without violating equal protection guarantees or imposing the
heavy burden of forced retirement on qualified, competent, but
older, judiciary.
I. GREGORY V. ASHCROFT
In Gregory v. Ashcroft,'5 the Eighth Circuit evaluated article V, sec-
tion 26(a) of the Missouri Constitution, which mandates the retire-
ment of state judges, other than municipal judges, at age seventy.' 6
Missouri divides its judiciary into two categories. In the first cate-
gory, a judge is elected in the same manner as all other state offi-
cials-by state partisan elections.' 7 In the second category, pursuant
to the Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan (Plan), judges are ap-
pointed by the governor.' 8 Under the Plan, the governor appoints
judges to the appellate courts, and to circuit courts in metropolitan
St. Louis and Kansas City. 19 Following the expiration of their ap-
pointed terms, these Plan judges are periodically listed on election
ballots. They face a "yes" or "no" vote on whether each judge shall
be retained in office. 20 Neither Plan nor non-Plan judges are re-
stricted in the number of terms they may serve if retained by voters,
by any authority other than the mandatory retirement provision of
the Missouri Constitution.2'
Judges Gregory, Nugent, and Greene, plaintiffs in Gregory, are Plan
15. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990). Defendant in this action is John D. Ashcroft,
Governor of the State of Missouri, in his official capacity.
16. Article V provides in pertinent part: "All judges other than municipal judges
shall retire at the age of seventy years .... " Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26(1) (1976).
17. Mo. REV. STAT. § 478.010 (1978). "Any person desiring to be an independ-
ent candidate for any office to be filled by voters throughout the state .... or circuit
judge district, shall file a petition with the secretary of state." Id. § 115.321(1). "[A]ll
candidates for elective office shall be nominated at a primary election ..... Id.
§ 115.339.
18. Article V provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office ofjudge of any of the following
courts of this state, to wit: The supreme court, the court of appeals, or in the
office of circuit or associate circuit judge within the city of St. Louis and
Jackson [C]ounty, the governor shall fill such vacancy by appointing one of
three persons possessing the qualifications for such office, who shall be
nominated and whose names shall be submitted to the governor by a non-
partisan judicial commission ....
Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(a) (1976).
19. Id.
20. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1) (1976).
21. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 599 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990).
1991]
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judges. They argue that, as Plan judges, they are entitled to ADEA
protection because they are "employees" of the state and because no
exception to the ADEA applies to them.22 They argue that, because
they were appointed by a governor instead of "elected to public of-
fice," 2 3 they are outside the ADEA's exception for elected officials.
Second, the judges maintain that Plan judges are not exempted from
ADEA protection as "appointee[s] on the policy-making level."24 Fi-
nally, they contend that Missouri's mandatory retirement provision is
not a rational method of regulating the judiciary to serve the state's
goal of maintaining a highly qualified and vigorous state judiciary
and, therefore, mandatory retirement violates equal protection
guarantees.2 5
The State of Missouri contends that Plan judges are not protected
by the ADEA since they are not "employees." 26 Missouri argues that
the judges are not deprived of equal protection guarantees because
age is not a suspect classification, and there is a rational basis for
requiring mandatory retirement.2 7
The district court upheld the mandatory retirement provision on
several grounds. Mandatory retirement ensures a vigorous judiciary,
opens state court benches to younger lawyers, makes it easier to ad-
minister pension plans, and eliminates the difficulties of determining
22. Judge McHaney, an elected judge, does not fall within the scope of the
ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988) (Under ADEA, the term " 'employee' shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State .... "). Thus, Judge McHaney
did not pursue the ADEA claim and joined only in the constitutional claim.
23. Plan judges are initially appointed by the governor and are retained in office
by voters pursuant to the Plan. The Plan judges are not considered to have been
"elected to public office" for purposes of the ADEA. The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) has taken the position that a state judge "who is ap-
pointed by the governor or the legislature but [who] must appear on a ballot before
the general electorate for either retention or rejection would be excepted from the
term 'employee' under the ADEA as a 'person elected to public office'" and would
thus be outside the ADEA's exception for elected officials. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 600
n.3 (quoting EEOC Opinion Letter to Rep. Claude Pepper, reprinted in EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) at N:1001 n.2 (Apr. 7, 1987)). The district court agreed with the
EEOC's opinion. Id. Because neither side presented this issue to the circuit court,
the Eighth Circuit assumed, for the purposes of Gregory, "that state judges selected
according to [the Plan] are appointed and not 'elected' within the meaning of the
ADEA." Id.
24. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 601. The judges focused their argument on their roles as
interpreters of the law rather than as makers of the law. Id.
25. Id. at 604. The judges argued that the mandatory retirement provision de-
prived them of due process. The Eighth Circuit noted that the judges had not articu-
lated what fundamental right had been denied. Thus, the Gregory court refused to
address the issue. Id. at 604 n.6.
26. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 540, 541 (E.D. Mo.
1990).
27. Id.
[Vol. 17
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whether older judges are competent. 28
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, 29 finding that the judges were ex-
cluded from the ADEA definition of "employee"30 because they
were "appointee[s] on the policy-making level."3' Further, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory retirement provision,
holding that it did not violate the plaintiffs' rights to equal protec-
tion.32 The court held that age was not a suspect classification3 3 and
that there was no fundamental right to government employment per
se.
3 4
Instead, the Gregory court applied a rational basis test to the equal
protection claim. 35 The court concluded that Missouri had demon-
strated a rational basis for its distinction between judges and other
state officials or employees to whom no mandatory retirement age
applies.36 The court noted that even if it disagreed with the pur-
ported rationales for mandatory judicial retirement at age seventy,
the rational basis test foreclosed the court's imposing its views on a
state that believed it had legitimate reasons for requiring the
mandatory retirement of itsjudiciary.37 The Supreme Court granted
the judges' petition for certiorari.3 8
28. Id at 544 (citing O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 766-67 (Mo. 1978)).
29. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990).
30. "Employee" is defined under the ADEA as:
[A]n individual employed by any employer except that the term 'employee'
shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person cho-
sen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on
the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise
of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
31. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 603.
32. Id at 606.
33. Id. at 604. The judges conceded that age classifications are not subject to
"heightened scrutiny for constitutional infirmity .... " Id.
34. Id. at 604 n.6 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976)). If a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the court will
exercise strict scrutiny, and the statute is almost always struck down. L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTUTLONAL LAw § 16-6, at 1452 (2d ed. 1988). The rational basis test
gives great deference to the legislature's judgment, and the court will uphold a state
statute if the statute and the results to be obtained serve any conceivable public pur-
pose. Id. § 16-3, at 1443.
35. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 604.
36. Id. at 605-06.
37. Id. at 606.
38. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
1991]
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II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT
A. Background
The ADEA, enacted through the power given to Congress under
the commerce clause,39 prohibits workplace bias based on age for
every worker forty years or older.40 The statute's primary purpose is
to ensure that employers base employment decisions on objective,
age-neutral criteria, such as individual ability, and not on subjective,
stereotypic and unsubstantiated age-based presumptions. 4' Thus,
39. The commerce clause provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce ... among the
several States... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
The ADEA originally included the requisite findings to base the legislation on
the commerce clause:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary dis-
crimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4)(1988).
The ADEA defines "commerce" to include "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation,
transmission or communication among the several States." Id. § 630(g).
40. Id. § 631(a). The original Act protected employees only up to age 65 years
and excluded from protection persons elected to public office and persons appointed
on a policy-making level. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, §§ 1 (b), 12, 81 Stat. 602, 605, 607 (1967) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (1988)). In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA to include state and local
governments, and to provide substantive protection to most federal employees. See
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 55,
74 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)). In 1978, Congress again
amended the Act, expanding the age group protected against discrimination from
age 65 to 70, prohibiting mandatory retirement of most employees under age 70, and
making significant procedural clarifications and modifications. See Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat.
189, 189-91 (1978) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)). Effective January
1, 1987, Congress made the ADEA applicable to all employees age 40 or over by
eliminating the upper age limit altogether. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342, 3345 (1986)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)).
41. The express purposes of the ADEA are: "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)
(1988). The abolishment of retirement for the majority of employees has had little
impact on the 40-year trend toward early retirement. Almost two-thirds of older
workers retire before age 65. In 1987, 54.4% of people age 55 to 64 were in the
labor force compared to 11.1% of people age 65 and over. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2307, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS DERIVED
[Vol. 17
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the Act prohibits employment decisions based on general assump-
tions concerning the existence of degenerative aging and its effects
on individual performance and ability.42 The ADEA explicitly ex-
cludes from its protection those employees working in occupations
where "age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of the particular business .... 43 Also
excluded from the ADEA's protection are elected officials and their
personal staffs, their policymaking appointees and their immediate
advisors .44
B. The Exceptions
The courts, when interpreting the coverage and exemptions of the
ADEA, broadly define the class of individuals who are entitled to the
ADEA's protections.45 Conversely, the courts narrowly construe the
ADEA's exceptions.46 This narrow construction is especially signifi-
cant when a person is forced to retire.47
Because the individual states establish and maintain court systems
that are independent from the federal system, 48 congressional regu-
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 1948-87 151-53 (1988) [hereinafter
STATISTICS].
42. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) (Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, city ordinance requiring assis-
tant fire chief's retirement at age 55 did not constitute a bona fide occupational qual-
ification and thus violated ADEA).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0 (1988).
44. Id § 630(0.
45. See, e.g., EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070
(6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983) (Salaried officers of nonprofit society
who performed traditional employee duties were employees covered by ADEA.).
46. See, e.g., Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 410 (1985) (Age-60
retirement requirement for flight engineers held to violate ADEA.).
47. See id.
48. Although not raised in Gregory, federal legislation has been challenged under
the tenth amendment as an infringement of a state's immunity from federal regula-
tion of certain core functions. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985). The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. In Garcia, the
Court noted that the purpose of tenth amendment immunity "is not to preserve 'a
sacred province of state autonomy,' " or to carve out express areas of state sover-
eignty. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236
(1983)). In rejecting precedent that supported state sovereignty, the Garcia court
insisted that this did not mean that there were no limitations on the federal govern-
ment's right to use its delegated powers. Rather, "[s]tate sovereign interests ... are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552.
Some indications that the structure of the federal government has been constitution-
ally arranged so as to protect state sovereignty are: the requirement that each state
have two Senators, the fact that the states are given general control over electoral
1991]
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lation of a state's judicial requirements constitutes a significant intru-
sion into a state-dominated affair.49 Explicit congressional intent to
preempt such traditional areas of state law must be shown before the
ADEA can be applied to these areas. 50
In enacting the ADEA, Congress defined the protected "em-
ployee" very broadly,51 but established several exceptions:
[T]he term "employee" shall not include any person elected to
public office in any State or political subdivision in any State by the
qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymak-
ing level or an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the
qualifications for federal elections, and the fact that the states have a special role in
presidential elections by means of the electoral college. Thus, the Court relied on
the political process and not the judiciary to preserve state powers. Id. at 551.
In Garcia, the court cited with approval EEOC v. Wyoming, in which the extension
of the ADEA to cover state and local governments was held to be a valid exercise of
Congress' power. Id. at 547 (citing EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)). Jus-
tices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented in EEOC v. Wyoming and
would have held the ADEA unconstitutional as applied to the states. EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). The dissent stated that the Constitution does not grant the national
government the power to impose "detailed standards governing the selection of state
employees .... " Id Nor does the Constitution "grant to the National Government
the power to impose such structures on the states either expressly or by implication."
Id.
Another attempt to invoke the restraints of the tenth amendment to the ADEA
was initiated in a recent post-Garcia case, EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.
1990). Justice Louis P. Peck, an appointed justice of the Vermont Supreme Court,
challenged the provision of the Vermont Constitution requiring mandatory retire-
ment of all judges at age 70 on the basis that this provision violated the ADEA. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the state's contention that the tenth
amendment precluded application of the ADEA to state-court judges. Id at 802.
The Second Circuit, relying on Garcia, held that state interests are properly protected
by procedural safeguards which are inherent in the federal system rather than by
limitations on federal power imposed by the judiciary. Id. Thus, where the national
political process is not defective, the tenth amendment is not involved. Id. (citing
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513 (1988)). Based on the federal courts'
decisions, it appears that the tenth amendment places few, if any, practical limitations
on the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause on matters of state
sovereignty.
49. The supremacy clause of the Constitution ensures that a federal statute takes
precedence over even a state constitutional provision. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
Thus, a state cannot impose requirements that violate federal anti-discrimination
statutes or constitutional provisions.
50. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). The Bass Court held that
section 1202(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which provides
that a person convicted of a felony "who receives, possesses, or transports in com-
merce or affecting commerce ... any firearm..." did not reach the "mere posses-
sion" of firearms because there was no clear statement of Congress' intention to
intrude into traditional state criminal jurisdiction. Id. at 350.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
[Vol. 17
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constitutional or legal powers of the office. 5
2
Thus, the broad definition of "employee" under the ADEA has
two basic exceptions. First, it does not apply to elected officials, in-
cluding elected judges.53 Elected officials must rely on the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection guarantee in their fight against
mandatory retirement. Second, the ADEA does not apply to certain
individuals who work for elected officials.54 The types of employees
falling under this second exception, and thus excluded from the Act,
are: (1) any person chosen by an elected official to be on that per-
son's staff; (2) an appointee on the policymaking level; or (3) "an
immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
or legal powers of the office."55 Whether appointed judges fall within
this second exemption and thus outside of the Act's protection is
unclear. Resolution of this question turns on whether a judge ap-
pointed to office is involved in "policymaking." 56 The issue of
whether judges are policymakers lies close to the heart of the judicial
function.
C. Application
The circuit courts have expressed differing opinions5 7 in interpret-
ing the legislative intent concerning the ADEA exception for policy-
makers.58 In Gregory v. Ashcroft,59 the Eighth Circuit determined that
Congress intended courts to apply a flexible standard in determining
who is not an "employee." The Gregory court did not explicitly limit
52. Id.
53. Id. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
55. It
56. See id.
57. Compare Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 603 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S.
Ct. 507 (1990) and EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that the ADEA does not apply to appointed judges because Congress did not intend
to overrule the intent of the people of the state) with EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d
794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Vermont Constitution's provision mandat-
ing retirement of state court judges at age 70 violated ADEA because state judges did
not fall within the policymaking appointee exception).
58. The legislative history of the ADEA exemptions provides:
It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials and members
of their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected officials as
advisors or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of the depart-
ments or agencies of State or local governments, such as cabinet officers,
and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local level. It is the con-
ferees intent that this exemption shall be construed narrowly.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF MANAGERS AT THE CONFERENCE ON H.R. 1746 TO
FURTHER PROMOTE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN WORKERS,
92d Congress, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2179,
2180 (emphasis added).
59. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
1991]
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the ADEA exception to policymakers but applied it to all those at
"the policymaking level."60
In applying this standard, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the First
Circuit, reasoning that "judging" is the equivalent of" 'lawmaking to
fill the interstices of authority found in constitutions, statutes, and
precedents.' "61 The Gregory court observed that it would be irra-
tional to exclude elected state judges but to protect appointed
judges from mandatory retirement because the powers and responsi-
bilities of appointed and elected judges are identical.62 Additionally,
the Gregory court compared the phrase "'on the policy-making
level' " to such phrases as " 'exercise of discretion' " and " 'exercise
of judgment,' " finding that all three phrases describe the perform-
ance of most judges. 63
Similarly, the First Circuit rejected the argument that the ADEA
overruled a Massachusetts constitutional provision mandating retire-
ment of state judges at age seventy in EEOC v. Massachusetts.64 Apply-
ing a flexible standard, the court held that the legislative history of
the ADEA did not provide a clear statement that Congress "intended
to overrule the clear intent of the people of a state in an area inti-
mately and fundamentally related to that state's self-governance."65
The panel recognized that judicial policymaking "is unlike that done
in the executive and legislative branches of government. It neverthe-
less requires the same kind of decisionmaking, and the same kind of
forward thinking that is required of 'appointees on the policy making
level' in those other two branches of government." 66 The First Cir-
cuit determined that judges, although at times "thought to act as
somewhat mechanized law-and-fact processors, scientifically apply-
ing settled principles of law to established fact patterns," nonethe-
less, are policymakers.67 The court held that each judge, acting "as a
separate and independent judicial officer, is at the very top of his
60. Id. at 603.
61. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 52 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting EEOC v.
Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Mass. 1988)); Gregory, 898 F.2d at 601.
62. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 603 n.5. Arguably, all elected officials are subject to the
electoral process and are thus tested at the polls. See 118 CONG. REC. S4492 (1972)
(discussion between Senators Williams and Ervin regarding intention of exceptions
to definition of employer). Congress may not have intended to interject the federal
courts into this testing process. Rather, Congress may have intended to leave this
core function to each state's political process. Just as elected judges are evaluated
individually by voters, appointed judges may be evaluated individually and should
not be subject to arbitrary termination on reaching a specific age.
63. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 601 (quoting EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55 (quot-
ing EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. at 462)).
64. 858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 53.
66. Id. at 55.
67. Id. at 54-55.
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particular 'policymaking' chain of command, responding.., only to
a higher appellate court." 68
In contrast to the First and Eighth Circuits' interpretations, the
Second Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, finding that ap-
pointed Vermont judges were shielded from mandatory retirement
by the ADEA in EEOC v. Vermont.69 The Second Circuit narrowly
read the ADEA exceptions.70 It determined that the exceptions did
not apply to state court judges because, based on the exceptions'
content and structure, Congress meant the policymaker category to
comprise only those policymakers working "closely with and [who
were] accountable to the [elected] official who appointed them."71
The placement of the policymaking appointee category between the
categories of personal staff and immediate advisors strongly sug-
gested to the Second Circuit that this exclusion was limited to per-
sons who had a relationship with or who were accountable to an
elected official.72 The court concluded that this relationship was es-
sential to determining the scope and meaning of "appointee on the
policymaking level." 7 3
The court, in EEOC v. Vermont, further concluded that even if ap-
pointed judges are within the type of appointees referenced in the
ADEA, they are not "policymakers" within the meaning of the stat-
ute. Instead, such judges resolve disputes and interpret policies es-
tablished by the legislative and executive branches. Even when
courts must determine legal principles or reconcile conflicting legal
principles, the courts' primary function is to "fathom the nature and
contours of policies established by the legislative and executive
branches rather than to create or fashion new policy." 74 Therefore,
Vermont's appointed judges were held to be "employees" within the
meaning of the ADEA and were entitled to its protections. 75
68. Id. at 56.
69. 904 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 798.
71. Id. at 800.
72. Id. at 799-800.
73. Id. at 800.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 801. The exception for appointees found at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988)
is identical to the exception for appointees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988). The only difference between the ADEA and Title
VII definitions of employee results from a 1984 amendment to the ADEA covering
United States citizens employed overseas. See Amendments of Older Americans Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(1988). During Senate debate on the definition of employer for Title VII purposes,
concern for the exception of elected officials and certain of their appointees arose.
Congressional concern focused on the broad coverage effected by the definition of
employer in the bill so that the amendment would be "broad enough ... to cover
[employees such as] Governors of States, State supreme court justices, State legisla-
1991]
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The Second Circuit held that appointed state court judges are pro-
tected by the ADEA because they are interpreters of legislative en-
actments and executive orders rather than makers of those laws.
This holding is consistent with the historical view that the judiciary is
independent of and separate from both the legislative and executive
branches. This view was first expressed by Alexander Hamilton in
The Federalist:
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgement; and must ultimately depend on the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgements. 76
The framers sought to maintain the independence of the judiciary by
limiting judges' roles to resolution of actual cases or controversies.
Thus the federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions which give
hypothetical advice about particular legislative or executive action. 77
The framers' concerns with maintaining the separation of powers
are echoed by the Supreme Court and the Missouri state courts. 78
Courts must apply the laws written and enacted by legislatures and
leave to those legislatures the fundamental issues of public policy.79
Although a court may consider policy implications, a judge's role as
an integral part of a separate and independent branch of govern-
ment is limited to interpreting executive or legislative policies, not to
the development of those policies.8 0
tors, and so forth." 118 CONG. REC. 4096 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). Senator
Ervin proposed an amendment to exclude those elected officials and certain of their
appointees. These appointees were described during the Senate debate as those
"who are in a close personal relationship and an immediate relationship with [the
elected official]." Id. at 4492-93.
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
77. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). The policy that prohibits fed-
eral courts from giving advisory opinions is implied in article III of the Constitution.
Id.
78. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (Powers vested in Special Divi-
sion do not violate article III, under which executive or administrative duties of a
nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on article III judges.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 120-44 (1976) (Because tasks performed by Federal Election Commission
were executive in nature, Congress had no constitutional right to appoint its officers);
In re Pate, 107 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) (Each of the three branches of
government may exercise only the powers given that branch.).
79. See Brinkmann v. Common School Dist. No. 27, 238 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951), aff'd, 255 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1953).
80. State v. One "Jack and Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1949).
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III. CONSTITUTIONALrrY OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT
Even if state judges are outside the protection of the ADEA, as the
First and Eighth Circuits have held, the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment may offer safeguards against forced re-
tirement for both appointed and elected judges.Sm Although the
minimal rational basis test has been applied to age discrimination
cases in the past, the use of an intermediate standard of review may
be more appropriate. In other words, a statute's age-based classifica-
tion should be substantially related to an important governmental
objective to pass judicial scrutiny.82 Application of an intermediate
standard of review would challenge rather than perpetuate the out-
dated and unfounded stereotypes on which age-based classifications
are founded.
The Supreme Court issued its first opinion on mandatory retire-
ment in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,8 3 which involved a
state law requiring retirement of state police at age fifty. The Court
summarized its standard of review in equal protection cases: "Equal
protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classifica-
tion only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the ex-
ercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class." 84 The Court concluded that
mandatory retirement at age fifty for state police under the Massa-
81. The equal protection clause provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Forced termination of a person's employment based solely on age may also run
afoul of the ninth amendment's declaration that "(t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." Id. amend. IX. The ninth amendment suggests "that the set of rights
protected by the Constitution is not closed and that judges may be authorized to
protect these 'unenumerated' rights on occasion." Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1988). The right to choose and follow a profes-
sion has been recognized as one of these unenumerated, extra-Constitutional, funda-
mental rights "retained" by the people. Id. at 32 n.106 (citing W. MURPHY, J.
FLEMING & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1083-84 (1986)).
See also L. TRIBE & M. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1991).
82. This test is derived from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See infra
text accompanying notes 98-102.
83. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
84. Id. at 312 (footnotes omitted). The exercise of fundamental rights, one of
the two criteria allowing for strict scrutiny review, involves those rights that are ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. In cases where fundamental
rights or liberties are at issue, the court will use the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Consequently, the Court will determine whether the legislature's classification is nec-
essary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest. See generally L.
TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-7, at 1454 (Legislative classifications are unconstitutional
1991]
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chusetts' statute neither interfered with the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right nor operated to the disadvantage of a suspect class. 85 It
then applied minimal scrutiny and upheld the statute.
Whether Murgia is dispositive of the constitutionality of all other
mandatory age retirement laws is open to question. The law en-
forcement profession under consideration in Murgia involved physi-
cal fitness and the physical protection of the public as opposed to
mental capacity. The police officers' duties involved vigorous physi-
cal demands and the effective level of protection afforded the public
was dependent upon each officer's physical abilities. By applying the
lowest level of scrutiny, the Court avoided considering the merits of
the arguments proposed by those opposing mandatory retirement.
Instead, the Court found that the state's goal of assuring the physical
preparedness of the police force was legitimate. The Murgia Court
also concluded that, because "physical ability generally declines with
age," mandatory retirement of police officers was rationally related
if they distribute burdens or benefits in a manner inconsistent with fundamental
rights without a compelling governmental justification.).
As noted in Murgia, those cases involving a suspect class also require an in-
creased level of scrutiny and a compelling governmental interest. Murgia, 427 U.S. at
312. Laws that classify individuals on the basis of race or national origin are suspect.
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-13, at 1465-66, § 16-14, at 1466-74 (discuss-
ing reasons for using strict scrutiny). Although it could be argued that a classification
based on age is always "suspect," to qualify for suspect class treatment under a strict
scrutiny standard, prior cases have consistently required "traditional indicia of sus-
pectness." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). These
"traditional indicia" include: that the disadvantaged class be a "discrete and insular
minorit[y]," United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938), and
that the class has historically been treated in a purposefully unequal way, or placed in
a position of political powerlessness. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. While admitting that
the state could have chosen to individually test for fitness past age 50, in Murgia the
Court refused to find that people over age 50 constitute a "discrete and insular"
group worthy of extraordinary protection from the political process because "[old
age] marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span." Murgia,
427 U.S. at 313-14.
85. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. One commentator disagrees with the Court's con-
clusion. Professor Abramson notes that "[t]he right of the individual to engage in
any lawful occupation has been repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court as fall-
ing within the concept of 'liberty' articulated in the fourteenth amendment." Abram-
son, Compulsory Retirement, the Constitution and the Murgia Case, 42 Mo. L. REV. 25, 49
(1977). Professor Abramson claims that the Court stumbled on the question of em-
ployment as a fundamental right and states:
While the elderly are not in the same class as those individuals classified on
the basis of race, they are arguably subject to discrimination when they are
denied an important benefit such as employment. The Court's decision ...
[that the right to work is not fundamental] disregards the significant nature
of the benefits denied and the hardships which may result.
Id. at 50. See also Comment, O'Neil v. Baine: Application of Middle-Level Scrutiny to Old-
Age Classifications, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 801 n.16 (1979).
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to that goal.86
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Murgia, urged application of a "flex-
ible equal protection standard" using a heightened level of scrutiny
that may have invalidated the statute.87 Justice Marshall complained
that "pigeonholing fails to consider openly the character of the clas-
sification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the
class discriminated against of 'the governmental benefits that they do
not receive, and the state interests asserted in support of the classifi-
cation.' -88 Dissenting in both Murgia 89 and Vance v. Bradley,90 Jus-
tice Marshall argued that mandatory retirement provisions warrant
more than minimal equal protection review because of the impor-
tance of the interests at stake and the prevalence of discrimination
against the elderly.91
The intermediate standard of review proposed by Justice Marshall
would rebut the strong presumption of constitutionality that exists
under the rational basis test. It also would forbid the use of an arbi-
trary age-based classification system. 92
A. Background
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply the rubber-stamp
of minimal review or the death-blow of strict scrutiny in all situa-
tions. Therefore, a third intermediate level of analysis has been
used.93 The Court recognizes that the all-or-nothing choice between
86. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315. See generally Comment, supra note 85, at 798 (dis-
cussing the judicial history of mandatory retirement in the United States).
87. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Comment, supra note 85, at 805 (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318 (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
89. 427 U.S. at 318.
90. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
91. In Bradley, the Court again considered an equal protection challenge to a
mandatory retirement rule. The challenge related to the Foreign Service retirement
system which affected federal employees and stressed the absence of any comparable
requirement for federal Civil Service employees. Following the standard of review
established in Murgia, the Court rejected the constitutional challenge in Bradley. The
Bradley Court held that when the challenged legislative classification is based on age,
only the rational basis test need be applied. Justice White, writing for the majority,
explained the propriety of minimum rationality review by noting that "[t]he Constitu-
tion presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident deci-
sions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a polit-
ical branch has acted." Id. at 97.
92. A state's constitution may be construed as guaranteeing the citizens of its
state even more protection than federal provisions. See generally Brennan, State Consti-
tutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977) (lauding activ-
ism of state courts in their expansion of individual rights under state constitutions).
93. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (inter-
mediate scrutiny applied to classification based on gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
1991]
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss3/7
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
minimum rationality and strict scrutiny does not suit the broad range
of situations arising under the equal protection clause. The Court
has invoked this intermediate level of scrutiny in cases where classifi-
cations are based on characteristics determined at birth.94
In cases involving discrimination based on gender and illegiti-
macy, for instance, the Court has used this intermediate level of
equal protection analysis, applying a heightened, although not strict,
scrutiny. As stated in Murgia, the strict scrutiny test requires that the
legislature's provisions be necessary to serve a compelling state in-
terest.95 In contrast, the rational basis standard merely requires that
judicial inquiry be limited to whether the statutory scheme is ration-
ally related to a legitimate state purpose. Unlike either of the previ-
ous tests, the intermediate level of review has been used to discern
whether a discriminatory provision serves an important or significant
governmental objective and whether the classification is "substan-
tially related" to achieving that objective. In this middle-level re-
view, the legislative objective must be important and the court may
scrutinize the ends and means of the challenged statute, instead of
merely pronouncing it valid or invalid under traditional analyses.96
Almost every governmental interest urged in support of a statute
can be deemed "important" and therefore sufficient to meet the first
prong of this intermediate scrutiny test. The requirement that the
190 (1976) (intermediate scrutiny applied to classification based on gender); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny applied to classification based
on illegitimacy).
This middle-level review is not always candidly admitted by the Court and often
has been hidden behind a mask of purported minimum rationality. It has been ar-
gued that the use of intermediate scrutiny is unacceptable because the triggering
mechanism for heightened scrutiny is hidden. This concealment confuses legisla-
tures and lower courts, leaving the courts unaccountable for their decisions and free
to attach their own values onto the equal protection clause. Note, Rational Basis With
Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. LJ. 779, 800-02 (1987). The
following cases, cited in Note supra, at 779, 785, are examples of the Court's use of
intermediate scrutiny under the guise of the rational basis label: City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (Mental retardation is not quasi-suspect
classification.); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (Guaran-
tees of equal protection were violated by unequal division of benefits between simi-
larly situated residents.); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (In-state and out-
state residents must be treated similarly as to automobile tax.); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (Discriminating against nonresidents is not legiti-
mate state purpose.); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (No legitimate interest is
served in distinguishing between residents based on the length of time they have
lived in the state.).
94. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate level
scrutiny to gender); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying intermediate
level scrutiny to illegitimate children).
95. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
96. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982). See also Note, supra note 93, at
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means chosen be "substantially related" to the end has had consider-
ably more effect. The second prong of the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review is more likely to be satisfied if there are no better
alternatives available to carry out the asserted objectives.97
This intermediate standard was formulated in Craig v. Boren,98 a
successful challenge to a gender-based classification. In Craig, an
Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under
age twenty-one and females under age eighteen.99 The Court pro-
nounced that statutes incorporating "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."100 The court deter-
mined that the state's concern for traffic fatalities did not justify the
distinction drawn between males and females in the sale of 3.2%
beer.101
Although the Craig Court did not specifically state that it was for-
mulating a new standard of judicial review, the concurring and dis-
senting opinions viewed the majority as having formulated a third,
middle-level of scrutiny. The majority's close examination of evi-
dence provided by the state to support its argument that the statute
was necessary to prevent traffic fatalities evidenced a departure from
the standard of review typically applied when "fundamental" consti-
tutional rights and "suspect classes" were absent. The majority in
Craig sharply criticized what it called outdated misconceptions and
over-broad generalizations about females and their use of alcohol as
"loose-fitting" characterizations that could not support, because of
their factual inaccuracy, the statute under review.102
Classification of persons based on gender is analogous to classifi-
cations of persons based on age. 03 Both classifications have been
97. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The Court rejected a statute
that barred illegitimate children from inheriting from their natural fathers under in-
testacy statutes. The Trimble Court held that a more limited rule could have been
formulated, such as one excluding only those illegitimate children whose paternity
had not been established during prior court proceedings. Id. at 772. Such a limited
rule would have met the state's objectives of barring false claims and easing the judi-
ciary's burden of resolving paternity claims during estate proceedings. Yet, the rule
would have disadvantaged only some illegitimate children. Id. at 776.
98. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
99. The Oklahoma statute stated: "It shall be unlawful for any person... to sell,
barter or give to any minor any beverage containing more than one-half of one per-
cent of alcohol measured by volume and not more than three and two-tenths (3.2)
percent of alcohol measured by weight." Id. at 191 n. I (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 37,
§ 241 (1958 and Supp. 1976)).
100. Id. at 197.
101. Id. at 201-03.
102. Id. at 199.
103. Robert N. Butler, founding director of the National Institute on Aging, has
defined "ageism" as:
19911
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subjected to stereotypes. Women have been perceived primarily as
wives and dependents who lack business sense, the weaker sex whose
place is "in the home" rather than in the "marketplace and world of
ideas."104 Similarly, older individuals have been perceived as incom-
petent, with deteriorating abilities.105 These "loose-fitting" and
stereotypical characterizations are incapable of supporting state con-
stitutional or statutory schemes that are, ultimately, premised on
their accuracy. Age, like gender, is an immutable characteristic de-
termined solely by the accidental timing and circumstances of birth.
Consequently, discrimination based on age violates a basic concept
of our society "that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility .... "106 Age, like gender, is in most in-
stances irrelevant to one's ability to perform. Therefore, the inter-
mediate scrutiny test, which is applied to gender classification,
should be applied to discriminatory provisions based on age
classification. t0
7
B. Intermediate Scrutiny Applied
The intermediate level of scrutiny requires that the means chosen
bear a fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate state end.108
The Gregory court acknowledged several important reasons for the
a systematic stereotyping of and discrimination against people because they
are old, just as racism and sexism accomplish this with skin color and gen-
der. Old people are categorized as senile, rigid in thought and manner, old-
fashioned in morality and skills .... Ageism allows the younger generation
to see older people as different from themselves; thus they subtly cease to
identify with their elders as human beings.
Butler, Dispelling Ageism: The Cross-Cutting Intervention, 503 THE ANNALS 138, 139
(1989) (footnote omitted).
104. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975). The Court invalidated Utah's
differential age-of-majority statute, notwithstanding the statute's purpose of foster-
ing "old notions" of role typing and preparing boys for their expected performance
in the economic and political worlds. Id.
105. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
106. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (applying this
reasoning to illegitimate children).
107. It has been suggested that the proper standard of review should be strict
scrutiny because the effect of mandatory retirement laws on the judiciary is to inhibit
access to the ballots and to limit voting rights-both of which are fundamental rights
requiring a higher standard of review. In an amicus curiae brief filed with the United
States Supreme Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, Judge John W. Keefe concluded that Mis-
souri's mandatory retirement law "is not necessary to promote any articulated com-
pelling state interest, is not drafted in the least drastic means and cannot withstand
strict scrutiny." Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, The Honorable
John W. Keefe, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990) (brief filed with Supreme Court).
108. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
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mandatory retirement provision for state judges.lO9 These reasons
were articulated by the Missouri Supreme Court more than twelve
years earlier in O'Neil v. Baine.t10 The purported justifications for
mandatory retirement include:
(1) the "interest in a judicial system of the highest caliber which
justifies" the withdrawal from the bench of the group ofjudges in
which disabilities related to aging are most likely to occur;
(2) "the advantages of an objective line 'to avoid the tedious and
often perplexing decisions to determine which judges after a cer-
tain age are physically and mentally qualified and those who are
not;'"
(3) the judicial opportunities opened up to younger lawyers with
"fresh ideas and techniques;"
(4) "the interest in assuring 'predictability and ease in establish-
ing and administering judge's pension plans.' "1 I I
The Gregory court noted that other courts had approved similar
justifications for mandatory retirement, including the elimination of
the "'unpleasantness of selectively removing aged .. .judges;' "112
the treatment of " 'judges differently from other officials on the
ground that the work of judges makes unique and exacting demands
on faculties that age tends to erode;' "113 and elimination of " 'the
anguish, time, delay, expense, and embarrassment of the supervision
and removal of older judges of failing competence pursuant to an
evaluation process.' "114
In Gregory, neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit ex-
amined whether Missouri's reasons were supported by data or by ste-
reotypes. In adhering to the rational basis test, the court reasoned
that the legislature could assume that mandatory retirement serves
this goal despite empirical evidence showing that age has no bearing
on performance.115 Had the court applied the intermediate standard
109. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990).
110. 568 S.W.2d 761, 766-67 (Mo. 1978).
111. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 605 (quoting O'Neil, 568 S.W.2d at 766-67).
112. Id. (quoting Malmed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 955 (1980) (The Third Circuit held that it was not irrational for Penn-
sylvania to be concerned with the senility of its judges and upheld a state constitu-
tional provision requiring state judges to retire at age 70.)).
113. Id. (quoting Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 906 (1979) (The Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Compulsory Retire-
ment ofJudges Act, which automatically retires ajudge after the first general election
following his 70th birthday, does not violate either the United States or the Illinois
Constitution.)).
114. Id. (quoting Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427, 435-
36, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1988) (The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the
ADEA does not preempt the mandate of the state constitution that judges must retire
at the age of 70.)).
115. Id. at 606. The Gregory court stated: "One might disagree with some or all of
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of review, the court could have focused on these rationales and their
supporting evidence or lack of evidence.16
Medical research challenges the Gregory court's first assumption
that disabilities appear at age seventy."t 7 Recent studies show no
decline in average intelligence, at least until age eighty. In fact, it
appears that some intellectual functions remain stable with age while
others may actually improve.' 18 The presumption of incompetency
at age seventy is also rebutted by the existence of a federal judiciary
which is not subject to mandatory retirement. The ages of the fifty-
six judges within the Eighth Circuit's district courts range between
forty-three and eighty-eight.tt9 This wide range in age evidences a
balance between the fresh ideas of younger judges and the wisdom
of experienced judges.
Further, Missouri has shown its willingness to continue to employ
judges past the age of seventy by its practice of granting senior status
to certain judges-giving them the same powers as active judges.120
This undermines the state's argument that only those judges who are
under age seventy have the abilities needed to maintain a high cali-
ber judiciary. This line, drawn at age seventy, bears no relationship
to performance and is as unrelated to the state's purpose of a quali-
fied judiciary as a line drawn at age thirty.121
The state's second reason for mandatory retirement, the avoid-
ance of tedious and perplexing decisions regarding a judge's abili-
ties,' 22 is also inconsistent with its actual practice. Missouri has in
place a commission on retirement, removal and discipline of its judi-
these rationales on either empirical or philosophical grounds and yet be unable prop-
erly to conclude that a state which thinks otherwise lacks a rational basis for its
mandatory retirement rule for judges." Id.
116. One court applied the rational basis test and found that the mandatory retire-
ment system was not rationally related to the state's objectives of increasing available
judicial manpower or eliminating the embarrassment of removing a senile judge. See
Sabo v. Casey, 757 F. Supp. 587, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
117. Robert N. Butler, founding director of the National Institute on Aging, as-
serts that "senility is not inevitable with age; rather, it is a function of a variety of
brain diseases, most notably Alzheimer's disease and multi-infarct dementia." But-
ler, supra note 103, at 142. Butler suggests that the belief that all old people are
senile and debilitated is a myth stemming from our fear of aging. Id. at 146.
118. "[Tjhere is also evidence that healthy older adults can improve their intellec-
tual performance following cognitive training and may even demonstrate superior
performance in select domains such as knowledge about their profession or life mat-
ters." Aging of Intelligence, supra note 9, at 44.
119. See generally I Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, 1-45 (1991).
120. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26(3) (1976).
121. "[I]t is always important to remember that persons of the same chronological
age are not identical as to their mental status. There are 70-year-olds who function
like 30-year-olds and vice versa." Aging of Intelligence, supra note 9, at 46.
122. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990).
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ciary.123 The commission was formed to "receive and investigate all
requests and suggestions for retirement for disability, and all com-
plaints concerning misconduct of all judges, members of the judicial
commissions, and of this commission."124 The commission has the
authority to require that the state supreme court retire any judge
who is incapable of discharging the duties ofjudicial office with effi-
ciency because of permanent physical or mental disability.125 Disa-
bilities may include the commission of a crime, misconduct, habitual
drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompe-
tency, and any offense involving moral turpitude or oppression in
office.12 6 Thus, there is an alternative already in place to ensure the
quality of all Missouri judiciary that is less restrictive than mandatory
retirement. A rule of mandatory retirement at age seventy is unnec-
essary because the commission is constitutionally mandated to vigi-
lantly evaluate and remove judges who are mentally or physically
unfit, regardless of age.
The uncomfortableness encountered by legislative or judicial com-
mittees making these judgments must be weighed against the unfair-
ness of the restrictions placed on qualified judges who reach the age
of seventy. By attempting to draw an objective line at age seventy,
the state is avoiding individualized treatment of older employees, an
action which Congress has determined to be against public policy.1 27
Efficiency should not be substituted for fairness. By requiring retire-
ment at a specified age, this class of people are denied access to full
employment. Productive and capable employees are being excluded
because of assumptions based on stereotypes regarding their
performance.
The state's third purpose in requiring retirement of its judges is to
encourage the placement of younger judges on the bench.128 How-
ever, demographic evidence indicates that the older population has
increased far more rapidly than the rest of the population for most of
this century and the number of youth entering the labor market has
123. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 24 (1970, amended 1976).
124. Id. § 24(1).
125. Id. § 24(2).
126. Id. § 24(3).
127. Employment opportunities are not to be denied to a person because of ste-
reotypes about a group to which that person belongs. H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986). During oral argument before the Supreme Court on March
18, 1991, Justice Stevens questioned whether Missouri could justify a mandatory re-
tirement age of 50. When Deputy Attorney General James B. Deutsch responded
"yes," Justice Stevens suggested retirement at age 35. The Deputy Attorney General
agreed that, although retirement at age 35 would move judges through the system
even faster, this would be too fast. 59 U.S.L.W. 3685 (April 9, 1991).
128. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507
(1990).
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declined significantly.129 America is growing older. In the last two
decades, the 65-plus population grew by 56% while the 16-64 popu-
lation increased by only 38%.1so
Even if mandatory retirement ensures the input of new ideas and
promotional opportunities for younger persons, it also deprives the
court of the talents of its most experienced legal minds. Further, this
purpose assumes that younger judges are more able, intelligent, cre-
ative, dedicated, and productive than older judges.' 3 ' However,
older judges, who have established track records of performance and
commitment, typically have greater independence than their younger
associates and no longer need to be students in the workplace.
"They can afford to be teachers .... "132
The state's final reason for imposing mandatory retirement is the
resulting administrative ease of handling pension plans.133 Again,
this purpose is refuted by Missouri's actual treatment of other state
employees. Like most states, Missouri administers pension plans
covering employees who are protected from mandatory retirement
under the ADEA. There is no reason why the administration of pen-
sion plans for judges would be any more difficult. Further, adminis-
trative ease and convenience are not sufficient reasons to
discriminate based on gender, 13 4 nor should they be relied on to dis-
criminate based on age.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT
The existence of less restrictive alternatives casts doubt on
whether the relationship between the mandatory retirement provi-
sions and the desired results set forth by Missouri is substantial. In
addition to the safeguards of judicial quality already in place in Mis-
souri, 1 35 another alternative to mandatory retirement is legislation
that would require a judge who wishes to continue employment past
age seventy to take physical and mental ability examinations. The
129. The number of people age 16-19 entering the labor force declined from
9,351,000 in 1977 to 7,988,000 in 1987. STATIsTIcs, supra note 41, at 77.
130. The 65-plus population grew from 18,029,000 in 1967 to 28,108,000 in 1987
(a 56% increase). The population in the 16-64 age group grew from 111,845,000 in
1967 to 154,645,000 in 1987 (a 38% increase). Id. at 16, 38.
131. Schrank & Waring, Older Workers: Ambivalence and Interventions, in 503 THE AN-
NALS 113, 117 (1989).
132. Id.
133. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 605 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990).
134. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court held a statute prefer-
ring men over women as administrators of estates unconstitutional, rejecting the con-
tention that the preference for men reduced the workload of the courts by
eliminating hearings on the merits. Id. at 76-77.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
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evaluation process could also include a study of the judge's judicial
performance. Under this scheme, the assumption of disability at age
seventy would be a rebuttable presumption. This rebuttable pre-
sumption of disability would meet Missouri's objectives of ensuring a
qualified judiciary and yet would not disadvantage judges who wish
to remain on the bench and who are fully capable of doing so. Such
an evaluation process would incorporate an element of fairness into
the retirement provision and promote the retention of personal dig-
nity and individuality while responding to governmental concerns re-
garding judicial proficiency. This program would also treat elected
and appointed judges similarly and allow an exception to the general
rule of arbitrary imposition of incapacity at age seventy.
It can be argued that this proposal of individualized testing at age
seventy would cause embarrassment to unqualified judges who chal-
lenge the mandatory retirement provision. Although the Constitu-
tion provides equal protection to all persons, it does not provide a
right to avoid embarrassment. The potential for embarrassment to
both judges and the reviewing committee is a necessary cost to en-
sure that fully competent judges are provided an opportunity to re-
main on the bench past an arbitrary age limit.
Another alternative is to formulate clear public standards for judi-
cial competency, including the public's right to be informed about
judges' illnesses and their effect on the work of the court. Internal
and informal mechanisms, such as peer group pressure, would be
exerted on judges who are incapable of performing up to these stan-
dards. Moreover, the mass media would exert pressure on disabled
judges to abdicate their seats. Clear public standards for judicial
competency ensure that voters are not denied the opportunity to re-
elect competent judges simply because they are over seventy.
Missouri's objectives of maintaining a high quality judiciary are im-
portant. However, the existence of less restrictive alternatives indi-
cates that the method chosen to ensure the quality of the state's
judiciary-the imposition of mandatory retirement at age seventy-
lacks a fair and substantial relationship to that goal and thus cannot
withstand the intermediate scrutiny test.
CONCLUSION
A tenaciously held principle of our society arising out of the Con-
stitution itself, is that each person should be treated as an individual,
rather than as a statistic or as a stereotypic member of a group. Yet,
mandatory retirement treats all judges who reach the age of seventy
as if they were incompetent. To assume that seventy-year-old judges
are unfit to perform their judicial duties, simply because some per-
sons of like age have certain characteristics, is to condemn by statisti-
cal stereotype. By upholding mandatory retirement at a specific age,
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the Court would be adhering to "an obsolete scheme of retirement
reflecting an ancient, illogical and now repudiated policy,"13 6 and
substituting chronological age for individualized physical/mental
evaluation. Mandatory retirement itself, at any age, can have devas-
tating effects on an individual's mental and physical ability.'37 Re-
maining active and involved as one grows older contributes to the
maintenance and even improvement of intellectual functioning.138
Older citizens suffer from discrimination based on generalizations
that are inaccurate for many, if not most. The increasing sensitivity
of legislators to their plight, evidenced by the enactment of the
ADEA and similar state statutes, has eliminated age discrimination
for some.
As they discuss Gregory, each Supreme CourtJustice need only look
to his or her right or left to discover that age itself is not an accurate
indicator of judicial ability.
Darlene M. Severson
136. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Joint Appendix at 9, Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990) (brief filed
with Supreme Court).
137. See Somers, Social, Economic, and Health Aspects of Mandatoy Retirement, 6 J. OF
HEALTH, PoLITIcs, POLICY & LAw 542, 547 (1981).
138. Butler, supra note 103, at 146.
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